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Introduction 
The paper aims to study the principles of economic behavior of government, 
notably with regard to the tax burden. It is commonly known that the main functions 
of taxes are fiscal function, when the government collects taxes in order to fulfill the 
budget for providing its own economic and social policy, and regulatory function, 
consisting in the adjustment of the state’s economic policy and of appropriate 
economic relations. By increasing taxes the government, ceteris paribus, aims to 
raise budget revenue. By reducing the tax burden it induces the additional investment 
inflow caused by improvement of economic environment. Under this fiscal aspect the 
government faces two main problems, notably: 
1) the contradiction between the need to fulfill budget and to improve the 
economic climate by means of adjustment of the tax burden; 
2) possibility of appearance of the “race to the bottom” situation, when some 
countries compete against each other in order to attract new investors by reducing the 
tax burden on a regular basis. 
So, a given government has three alternative variants of tax behavior, notably, 
either to reduce the tax rate in order to improve economic conditions and to attract 
new investors or to increase the tax rate as a way to raise budget revenue. Also it can 
fix the tax rate, i.e. do not use this tax instrument itself. 
However, the government when it increases the tax rate, it affects only the 
investors’ interests, while the reduction of the tax burden could serve as the tool of 
competition between jurisdictions, i.e. it is the “race to the bottom” case. 
2. Literature review 
The large part of research focused on the patterns of government tax 
behavior in different economic conditions. Joumard & Kongsrud (2003) 
studied the government economic and fiscal behavior in the process of 
decentralization in OECD countries. They analyzed the spending side, the 
revenue side and the macroeconomic perspective of fiscal relations across 
government levels. The authors developed a set of parameters (size of 
jurisdictions, overlapping responsibilities, social transfers and redistributive 
goods, tax competition, fiscal rules and market discipline etc.) in order to 
assess fiscal relations across different levels of government. Weber et al. 
(2014) investigated the government behavior and taxation. They found that 
behavioral economic factors can significantly influence tax compliance, and if 
well applied, usually cause an increase in compliance; these behavioral factors 
affect decision-making in ways that are important for making good tax policy. 
Mirrlees et al. (2011) in the final report from the Mirrlees Review “Tax by 
design” developed some important patterns of the government’s tax behavior, 
notably, they underlined the central role of redistribution in the tax and benefit 
system and the importance of maintaining neutrality. 
Another set of papers studies the aspects of government behavior 
influenced by different institutional factors. Thus, Krishna & Slemrod (2003) 
analyzed the tax behavior of the government aiming to minimize the perceived 
burden addressing particularly to the ethical and normative implications of 
price presentation in the tax system. Avi-Yonah (2011) found general 
conditions under which taxation as regulation makes sense: it should apply to 
small numbers of taxpayers; the taxpayers are sophisticated and able to deal 
with complex tax incentive and the regulatory goal is clear and related to the 
level of the tax. Laffer et al. (2011) estimated the economic burden caused by 
complexity of the Tax Code. They outlined that the potential benefits to 
economic growth could be from a reduction in tax complexity. Under 
establishment of the low rate flat tax on a broad tax base the inefficiencies 
caused by tax code complexity, notably, administrative costs, time costs, and 
compliance costs would be substantially reduced. As a result, overall economic 
efficiency would increase, as well as the growth in income and wealth. 
Leicester et al. (2012) analyzed behavioral aspects of government’s tax and 
benefit policy intervention taking into account such behavioral insights like 
bounded rationality, framing, time inconsistency, social preferences etc. The 
administrative techniques and institutions for the management of tax 
complexity were investigated by Freedman (2015). She concluded that 
institutions can also improve tax systems and sometimes reduce complexity, 
but this simplification will only be achieved if the institutions are conceptually 
coherent with clear tax policy objectives. 
Afonso & Hauptmeier (2003) analyzed the determinants of 
government’s fiscal behaviour in EU countries. Their results show that the 
existence of effective fiscal rules, the degree of public spending 
decentralization, and the electoral cycle can impinge on the country’s fiscal 
position. Another cross-country analysis was made by Bessard (2009), who 
calculated the tax oppression index (including the weight of the tax burden, the 
legitimacy of the tax system and the protection of financial privacy) for 30 
OECD countries in order to evaluate the OECD’s fight against harmful tax 
competition and “tax havens”. He showed that the only ones to gain from this 
fight are unreformed high-tax states, to the detriment of their residents and 
their prosperity. Furthermore, Stănică (2011) and Daianu et al. (2012 a,b) 
studied empirically the state fiscal policy which aims to promote the economic 
growth using different tax instruments, notably tax incentives, adjustment of 
the flat tax and social security contributions, increase of fiscal consolidation 
etc. 
In summary, we can conclude that current studies mainly investigate the 
government tax behavior (policy) from the standpoint of expediency of certain 
regulatory and adjustment measures. Any government considers its own 
economy as perfect or its own tax system as optimal. But at the same time by 
no means all of them use the proposed instruments in order to improve the 
situation. 
The studies of the causes of this fact, which we evaluate as important, 
are not sufficiently covered in the existing literature. Notably, we consider the 
insufficiently exhaustive and clear answer about government’s tax behavior 
when it chooses the direction of change of the tax burden in certain economic 
conditions. 
Consequently the purpose of this paper is to determine factors and 
conditions, which influence on government’s decision related to the choice of 
certain type of tax behavior. This allowed us to set the following tasks: 
 to define a set of potential indicators, based on which the government makes 
a decision concerning certain economic (tax) behavior; 
 to identify if such a dependence in fact exists; 
 to analyze which indicators influence more over the government’s economic 
behavior; 
 to define principles (nature) of the government response, i.e. under what 
conditions the government intend to increase the tax burden, to reduce it or 
to keep it at the same level. 
Let us assume that governments’ behavior patterns mostly correspond to 
the definition of satisfiers
1
, i.e.: 
 they initially intend to achieve the required (under current conditions) level 
of budget revenue; 
 in the stable situation governments tend to increase the attractiveness of 
their economies by reducing the tax rate; 
 being economically efficient leaders they considerably disengage to 
improve the country’s economic climate, notably, by use of tax instruments. 
3. Data and Methodology 
In the article we analyze the economic behavior of OECD governments, which 
for the purposes of study can be regarded as adjustment of the corporate tax burden. 
It should be noted that in some countries, like Germany, the corporate tax rates, 
established by local authorities, differ by region. In this case we used a weight-
average tax burden, adjusted by some central government. 
Now the task is to examine the possible impact of the actual economic 
efficiency of the country on government’s economic behavior (i.e. on the changes of 
tax rates). GDP is the generally accepted indicator of power of the economy in the 
context of the world economic system while GDP per capita could be considered as 
indicator of the wealth of the economy. 
Taking into account the difference between domestic prices of a given market 
basket, one could examine the power and wealth of the economy outside the global 
                                           
1
 Here, in order to describe the behavior, we used the term “satisfiers” introduced by Simon (1955, 
1956), who distinguished the “maximizers”, aiming to maximize their own profit, and “satisfiers”, 
for whom it is enough to be profitable. 
framework and to measure these factors by purchasing power parity, i.e. by GDP 
(PPPs), GDP (PPPs) per capita. Thus, all mentioned indicators are based on the 
estimated increase of the value added, on the gross domestic product. But countries 
differs by a number of working hours required to produce GDP. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to estimate the efficiency of certain national economic system using the 
productivity of this economy (total or per capita), i.e. normalizing the size of GDP 
(total or per capita, in absolute terms or by purchasing power parity) by a number of 
hours worked. Further in order to evaluate the efficiency of economy (in terms of 
power and wealth) we provide the formal estimation of the correlation between the 
changes of corporate tax rates and each of the selected indicators. 
The sample 
We chose the OECD countries for the analysis according to the following 
considerations. The more powerful are the economies, the less they are influenced by 
different externalities, and, consequently, their behavior can be explained principally 
by internal factors and parameters of the economic system. Therefore, OECD 
countries, among which there are the most developed countries of the world, are the 
most representative for the analysis and estimation of the correlation between 
economic indicators of country and government’s behavior. 
At once, using in the sample the institutionally established group of countries 
increases the representativeness of the input data. Moreover, the available data for 
OECD countries is sufficiently complete and calibrated and the sample itself is 
sufficiently large: for example, more than 25% of all countries with available data on 
labor productivity are OECD countries. 
The analysis of governments’ behavior related to adjustment of the 
corporate tax burden in OECD countries 
We explore the data for 10 years (2005-2014) for 34 OECD member countries. 
In order to determine principles of the government’s behavior we examine the 
correlation between changes of corporate tax rates and selected indicators, which 
could be considered as characteristics of country’s aggregate economic efficiency: 
eight indicators, based on GDP and normalized in various ways on the level of 
consumer prices in the country, on per capita data and on per hour worked. I.e. we 
obtained GDP, GDP (PPPs), GDP per capita, GDP (PPPs) per capita, GDP per hour 
worked, GDP (PPPs) per hour worked, GDP per hour worked per capita, GDP (PPPs) 
per hour worked per capita. 
The input data on GDP, GDP (PPPs), GDP per capita, GDP (PPPs) per capita, 
average annual hours actually worked per worker, used in further analysis, are 
presented in Tables. 1, 2a-h. 
 
 
 Table 1. Corporate tax tares in OECD countries in 2005-2014  
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 
Austria 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 
Belgium 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 0,340 
Canada 0,361 0,361 0,335 0,330 0,310 0,280 0,260 0,260 0,265 0,265 
Chile 0,170 0,170 0,170 0,170 0,170 0,200 0,185 0,200 0,200 0,225 
Czech Republic 0,240 0,240 0,210 0,200 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 
Denmark 0,280 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,245 0,235 
Estonia 0,230 0,220 0,210 0,210 0,210 0,210 0,210 0,210 0,210 0,200 
Finland 0,260 0,260 0,260 0,260 0,260 0,260 0,245 0,245 0,200 0,200 
France 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 
Germany 0,383 0,384 0,295 0,294 0,294 0,294 0,295 0,296 0,296 0,297 
Greece 0,290 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,240 0,200 0,200 0,260 0,260 0,260 
Hungary 0,160 0,160 0,160 0,160 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 
Iceland 0,180 0,180 0,150 0,150 0,180 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 
Ireland 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 
Israel 0,310 0,290 0,270 0,260 0,250 0,240 0,250 0,250 0,265 0,265 
Italy 0,373 0,373 0,314 0,314 0,314 0,314 0,314 0,314 0,314 0,314 
 
  
 Table 1. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 0,407 0,407 0,407 0,407 0,407 0,407 0,380 0,380 0,356 0,331 
Korea 0,275 0,275 0,275 0,242 0,242 0,220 0,242 0,242 0,242 0,242 
Luxembourg 0,296 0,296 0,296 0,286 0,286 0,288 0,288 0,292 0,292 0,292 
Mexico 0,290 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 
Netherlands 0,296 0,255 0,255 0,255 0,255 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 
New Zealand 0,330 0,330 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 
Norway 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,270 0,270 
Poland 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 
Portugal 0,275 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,250 0,230 0,210 
Slovak Republic 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,190 0,230 0,220 0,220 
Slovenia 0,250 0,230 0,220 0,210 0,200 0,200 0,180 0,170 0,170 0,170 
Spain 0,350 0,325 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,280 
Sweden 0,280 0,280 0,280 0,263 0,263 0,263 0,263 0,220 0,220 0,220 
Switzerland 0,213 0,206 0,192 0,190 0,188 0,183 0,181 0,180 0,179 0,179 
Turkey 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200 
United Kingdom 0,300 0,300 0,300 0,280 0,280 0,260 0,240 0,230 0,210 0,200 
United States 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 0,400 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Table 2a. GDP per capita in OECD countries in 2005-2014 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 732,781 781,739 948,997 1052,869 996,461 1248,219 1500,355 1555,915 1501,883 1444,189 
Austria 315,187 334,603 386,995 429,638 398,602 390,383 429,493 407,801 428,456 437,123 
Belgium 387,618 411,059 472,964 522,556 487,065 485,307 528,721 499,129 524,970 534,672 
Canada 1164,179 1310,795 1457,873 1542,561 1370,839 1614,072 1788,741 1832,716 1838,964 1788,717 
Chile 123,060 154,722 173,085 179,571 172,128 217,308 250,655 265,099 276,586 257,968 
Czech 
Republic 
135,990 155,213 188,818 235,205 205,730 207,016 227,307 206,751 208,796 205,658 
Denmark 264,559 282,962 319,500 352,589 319,765 319,812 341,498 322,277 335,878 340,806 
Estonia 14,022 16,983 22,257 24,276 19,701 19,529 22,824 22,673 24,888 25,953 
Finland 204,786 216,742 255,739 285,087 252,137 248,262 273,925 256,849 268,281 271,165 
France 2207,450 2327,052 2666,805 2937,321 2700,658 2651,772 2865,304 2688,210 2807,306 2846,889 
Germany 2862,521 3001,251 3440,446 3764,675 3421,630 3418,371 3755,549 3535,199 3731,427 3859,547 
Greece 248,095 273,519 319,127 356,296 330,693 300,156 289,068 249,663 242,306 238,023 
Hungary 111,890 114,238 138,580 156,579 129,360 129,585 139,447 126,825 133,424 137,104 
Iceland 16,799 17,101 21,447 17,599 12,824 13,261 14,666 14,183 15,330 16,693 
Ireland 210,723 230,737 269,671 275,020 234,149 218,843 237,990 222,089 232,150 246,438 
Israel 141,222 152,231 176,675 213,919 206,477 232,910 258,408 257,205 290,551 303,771 
Italy 1856,684 1945,234 2207,143 2403,213 2191,781 2130,586 2280,315 2076,370 2137,615 2147,952 
 
  
Table 2a. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 4571,867 4356,750 4356,347 4849,185 5035,141 5495,387 5905,631 5954,475 4919,564 4616,335 
Korea 898,137 1011,797 1122,679 1002,219 901,935 1094,499 1202,464 1222,807 1304,468 1416,949 
Luxembourg 37,088 41,818 49,279 55,223 50,271 52,241 59,010 56,323 60,150 62,395 
Mexico 866,346 966,867 1043,472 1101,274 894,950 1051,128 1171,185 1186,663 1262,250 1282,725 
Netherlands 673,525 720,044 834,346 935,707 860,261 837,949 894,576 823,595 853,806 866,354 
New 
Zealand 
113,576 109,730 134,484 134,337 120,724 144,194 164,959 173,231 184,752 198,118 
Norway 308,722 345,423 400,886 461,946 386,382 428,527 498,157 509,705 522,349 500,244 
Poland 304,430 343,272 429,172 530,170 436,817 476,528 524,104 496,687 526,031 546,644 
Portugal 197,642 208,750 240,502 263,249 244,364 238,748 245,120 216,488 224,983 230,012 
Slovak 
Republic 
49,031 57,088 76,861 96,572 88,859 89,173 97,621 92,799 97,743 99,971 
Slovenia 36,401 39,624 48,181 55,853 50,372 48,060 51,299 46,288 48,005 49,506 
Spain 1159,257 1265,661 1481,393 1642,738 1502,876 1434,257 1495,968 1356,483 1393,476 1406,855 
Sweden 389,043 420,029 487,818 513,966 429,656 488,378 563,110 543,881 579,526 570,137 
Switzerland 407,535 429,392 477,686 551,013 539,785 580,696 696,528 665,898 685,871 712,050 
Turkey 482,737 529,278 646,425 730,628 614,389 731,539 774,729 788,605 821,918 806,108 
United 
Kingdom 
2415,053 2586,548 2964,399 2814,476 2318,782 2409,409 2594,114 2624,291 2680,123 2945,146 
United 
States 
13093,700 13855,900 14477,625 14718,575 14418,725 14964,400 15517,925 16163,150 16768,050 17418,925 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
  
 Table 2b. GDP (PPP) in OECD countries in 2005-2014 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 729,041 771,387 827,707 866,518 886,766 917,880 962,317 1014,858 1051,164 1095,384 
Austria 301,408 321,079 341,560 353,649 342,797 353,509 371,889 381,912 388,486 395,490 
Belgium 372,489 394,034 416,656 428,878 420,819 436,615 452,929 461,497 469,659 481,474 
Canada 1156,469 1223,256 1281,027 1321,508 1295,439 1355,512 1424,447 1477,904 1529,977 1591,580 
Chile 243,848 265,981 287,275 302,379 301,535 322,743 348,356 374,205 396,173 409,329 
Czech 
Republic 
231,284 254,783 276,026 289,070 277,163 286,988 298,664 301,569 303,915 314,585 
Denmark 209,419 224,057 231,908 234,770 224,515 230,943 238,436 241,130 243,531 249,527 
Estonia 26,119 29,725 32,927 31,784 27,305 28,327 31,301 33,344 34,393 35,621 
Finland 180,902 194,021 209,512 215,161 198,869 207,322 217,041 217,787 218,111 221,038 
France 2046,601 2159,587 2269,408 2318,445 2267,340 2340,155 2438,124 2490,198 2534,509 2580,750 
Germany 2803,191 3001,606 3185,997 3273,608 3114,430 3276,618 3466,666 3549,481 3610,061 3721,551 
Greece 296,980 323,907 344,289 349,483 336,661 322,207 299,709 285,039 278,018 284,255 
Hungary 199,724 214,019 220,838 227,148 213,879 218,201 226,729 227,388 234,296 246,354 
Iceland 10,436 11,212 12,630 13,025 12,449 12,214 12,732 13,109 13,765 14,210 
Ireland 177,993 193,497 208,444 206,986 195,272 197,113 206,760 209,813 213,309 226,768 
Israel 159,761 174,188 190,031 200,541 205,912 220,413 234,391 245,748 257,511 268,460 
Italy 1917,326 2015,892 2100,042 2118,758 2017,829 2077,420 2132,747 2110,893 2105,962 2127,743 
 
  
Table 2b. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 3858,502 4044,392 4243,030 4281,198 4075,293 4316,984 4386,152 4543,204 4685,286 4750,771 
Korea 1094,751 1186,796 1284,941 1347,214 1367,049 1473,651 1559,447 1623,836 1696,996 1778,823 
Luxembourg 36,366 39,314 42,968 44,025 41,992 44,692 46,805 47,569 49,240 51,411 
Mexico 1475,117 1596,486 1690,566 1747,866 1678,360 1785,682 1896,258 2007,659 2065,913 2140,564 
Netherlands 627,287 671,277 718,060 747,430 728,231 745,008 773,037 774,436 780,286 798,587 
New 
Zealand 
115,880 122,724 130,279 132,166 131,296 135,007 140,318 146,197 151,669 158,864 
Norway 262,061 276,583 292,261 299,140 296,521 301,950 311,169 325,463 332,764 345,160 
Poland 575,120 629,502 692,794 734,076 759,135 796,833 852,008 882,580 910,672 954,454 
Portugal 246,922 258,462 271,952 277,839 271,612 280,150 280,710 274,239 273,859 280,360 
Slovak 
Republic 
95,363 106,412 120,912 129,998 124,056 131,633 137,984 142,712 146,902 152,634 
Slovenia 47,889 52,153 57,257 60,307 56,027 57,404 58,948 58,423 58,701 61,127 
Spain 1295,272 1390,841 1481,672 1527,604 1484,171 1502,567 1524,078 1519,012 1522,711 1566,369 
Sweden 332,369 358,643 380,723 386,029 368,794 395,656 414,584 420,819 432,566 448,246 
Switzerland 336,048 360,573 385,471 401,763 396,257 412,612 429,124 441,640 456,932 472,830 
Turkey 919,946 1013,579 1089,128 1117,809 1071,944 1184,398 1314,897 1366,981 1444,566 1508,102 
United 
Kingdom 
1976,152 2098,838 2209,753 2245,619 2165,137 2233,479 2317,088 2374,234 2449,727 2548,889 
United 
States 
13093,700 13855,900 14477,625 14718,575 14418,725 14964,400 15517,925 16163,150 16768,050 17418,925 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
  
 Table 2c. GDP per capita in OECD countries in 2005-2014 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 36077,075 37897,806 45155,684 49026,233 45572,043 56295,912 66622,359 67882,238 64428,801 61219,156 
Austria 38319,371 40469,858 46620,512 51536,699 47662,388 46542,048 51003,191 48170,578 50499,804 51306,674 
Belgium 37107,353 39106,096 44684,430 48988,690 45295,434 44770,456 48062,759 44987,455 47033,359 47721,586 
Canada 36151,537 40296,667 44382,832 46464,702 40821,771 47530,602 52145,452 52818,117 52392,733 50397,862 
Chile 7612,565 9473,478 10486,921 10761,197 10199,090 12733,268 14526,082 15196,432 15686,964 14477,099 
Czech 
Republic 
13333,862 15181,880 18413,709 22739,599 19732,790 19787,293 21675,701 19680,401 19854,844 19563,330 
Denmark 48889,167 52135,316 58655,290 64390,556 58018,211 57782,724 61413,559 57750,313 59950,000 60563,623 
Estonia 10319,267 12573,195 16573,461 18137,285 14749,440 14647,333 17165,539 17109,122 18852,091 19670,852 
Finland 38965,429 41073,402 48248,175 53524,312 47115,792 46185,882 50714,960 47330,758 49214,372 49496,717 
France 36209,519 37900,031 43155,504 47273,321 43234,246 42249,064 45430,283 42416,867 44103,942 44538,147 
Germany 34723,318 36460,600 41845,496 45909,354 41828,059 41814,114 46752,729 43902,561 46199,633 47589,972 
Greece 22403,996 24614,451 28637,194 31862,746 29550,850 26839,152 25987,357 22445,596 21903,391 21653,081 
Hungary 11080,419 11336,553 13767,149 15587,745 12896,007 12940,392 13964,206 12769,315 13464,921 13881,131 
Iceland 57220,108 57024,186 69706,560 55789,328 40153,834 41749,947 46053,388 44379,613 47630,028 51261,875 
Ireland 50975,633 54510,371 61627,703 61318,497 51649,698 48046,567 52020,716 48433,914 50543,223 53461,974 
Israel 20387,525 21587,967 24619,591 29277,811 27596,286 30562,283 33286,909 32527,868 36066,174 36990,982 
Italy 32081,078 33501,430 37907,950 40973,485 37148,465 35995,617 38411,983 34959,128 35814,808 35823,219 
 
  
Table 2c. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 35780,571 34076,745 34038,349 37865,066 39321,220 42916,744 46175,364 46661,319 38632,962 36331,742 
Korea 18657,522 20917,030 23101,511 20474,887 18338,706 22151,209 24155,829 24453,971 25975,240 28100,717 
Luxembourg 79638,974 88428,555 102514,535 112883,393 100906,243 102937,690 113611,894 105970,202 110306,590 111716,268 
Mexico 8084,925 8918,073 9503,766 9894,250 7930,497 9196,893 10123,928 10137,654 10661,175 10714,826 
Netherlands 41269,909 44050,168 50930,635 56895,736 52042,427 50433,312 53589,909 49155,176 50809,705 51372,963 
New 
Zealand 
27421,483 26180,367 31786,861 31487,813 28001,256 33085,191 37580,487 39245,679 41490,293 43837,294 








Poland 7974,838 8996,285 11256,831 13909,503 11454,233 12532,674 13769,472 13048,811 13820,174 14378,622 
Portugal 18817,106 19838,829 22811,647 24933,218 23122,447 22580,678 23217,458 20588,807 21514,427 22130,488 
Slovak 
Republic 
9114,577 10593,086 14256,180 17897,650 16426,613 16447,196 18103,227 17171,302 18064,470 18454,040 
Slovenia 18222,579 19778,846 23966,354 27784,009 24785,048 23478,326 25021,584 22519,314 23316,676 24019,253 
Spain 26550,341 28531,246 32748,087 35724,769 32412,231 30802,845 32008,721 29005,506 29907,256 30278,346 
Sweden 42998,847 46089,924 53122,332 55525,761 45998,350 51869,158 59381,870 56915,732 60086,488 58491,468 
Switzerland 54960,893 57566,977 63615,123 72568,517 70083,701 74582,041 88504,231 83708,079 85317,955 87475,464 
Turkey 7053,954 7638,034 9213,851 10282,998 8528,558 10001,630 10437,717 10490,121 10806,883 10482,140 
United 
Kingdom 
40093,849 42693,577 48607,857 45839,858 37525,599 38697,910 40990,981 41194,424 41819,987 45653,410 
United 
States 
44218,306 46351,667 47954,532 48302,283 46909,422 48309,451 49724,999 51409,129 52939,101 54596,653 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Table 2d. GDP (PPP) per capita in OECD countries in 2005-2014  
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 35893 37396 39384 40349 40555 41397 42731 44277 45094 46433 
Austria 36644 38834 41147 42422 40990 42146 44163 45112 45789 46420 
Belgium 35659 37486 39365 40207 39135 40279 41173 41596 42078 42973 
Canada 35912 37606 38999 39806 38576 39917 41526 42593 43590 44843 
Chile 15085 16286 17405 18121 17867 18911 20188 21451 22470 22971 
Czech Republic 22677 24921 26918 27947 26584 27431 28480 28706 28900 29925 
Denmark 38700 41282 42575 42874 40736 41726 42879 43209 43467 44343 
Estonia 19221 22007 24519 23747 20442 21246 23540 25161 26052 26999 
Finland 34421 36768 39527 40396 37162 38570 40183 40133 40011 40347 
France 33571 35173 36725 37313 36297 37284 38657 39292 39818 40375 
Germany 34004 36465 38751 39921 38073 40080 43156 44080 44697 45888 
Greece 26819 29149 30895 31253 30084 28811 26944 25626 25132 25859 
Hungary 19779 21238 21939 22613 21322 21790 22705 22895 23645 24942 
Iceland 35548 37387 41049 41290 38979 38454 39982 41021 42767 43637 
Ireland 43058 45713 47636 46150 43074 43276 45194 45757 46441 49195 
Israel 23064 24702 26481 27447 27521 28923 30193 31079 31965 32691 
Italy 33129 34718 36068 36124 34200 35097 35926 35540 35284 35486 
 
  
Table 2d. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 30198 31634 33153 33430 31825 33714 34295 35602 36793 37390 
Korea 22742 24535 26440 27523 27796 29825 31327 32474 33791 35277 
Luxembourg 78090 83133 89387 89993 84288 88064 90114 89499 90298 92049 
Mexico 13766 14725 15397 15703 14873 15624 16392 17151 17449 17881 
Netherlands 38437 41067 43832 45448 44055 44839 46309 46221 46435 47355 
New Zealand 27978 29281 30793 30979 30453 30977 31967 33121 34061 35152 
Norway 56579 59202 61899 62490 61231 61520 62571 64600 65295 66937 
Poland 15066 16498 18171 19259 19906 20957 22384 23187 23926 25105 
Portugal 23509 24563 25795 26315 25701 26497 26589 26081 26188 26975 
Slovak Republic 17727 19745 22427 24092 22933 24279 25588 26407 27150 28175 
Slovenia 23974 26033 28481 29999 27567 28043 28753 28423 28512 29658 
Spain 29665 31353 32754 33221 32009 32270 32610 32481 32681 33711 
Sweden 36735 39354 41460 41704 39483 42022 43719 44038 44849 45986 
Switzerland 45320 48341 51335 52912 51449 52994 54527 55517 56839 58087 
Turkey 13443 14627 15524 15732 14880 16193 17715 18184 18994 19610 
United Kingdom 32807 34643 36234 36575 35039 35872 36614 37269 38225 39511 
United States 44218 46352 47955 48302 46909 48309 49725 51409 52939 54597 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  
 Table 2e. Labor productivity in OECD countries in 2005-2014 (GDP) 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 0,842 0,902 1,077 1,189 1,182 1,473 1,777 1,819 1,775 1,718 
Austria 0,359 0,390 0,439 0,491 0,484 0,473 0,515 0,490 0,516 0,524 
Belgium 0,564 0,600 0,676 0,754 0,733 0,738 0,814 0,772 0,810 0,828 
Canada 1,313 1,474 1,622 1,716 1,593 1,862 2,048 2,070 2,071 2,023 
Chile 0,128 0,181 0,204 0,198 0,195 0,249 0,291 0,305 0,313 0,291 
Czech Republic 0,153 0,173 0,212 0,254 0,240 0,235 0,263 0,241 0,244 0,239 
Denmark 0,311 0,333 0,379 0,437 0,421 0,449 0,479 0,458 0,481 0,486 
Estonia 0,013 0,016 0,021 0,024 0,025 0,025 0,027 0,026 0,029 0,030 
Finland 0,245 0,258 0,303 0,345 0,327 0,319 0,354 0,333 0,354 0,360 
France 3,174 3,434 3,900 4,349 4,190 4,132 4,464 4,155 4,333 4,425 
Germany 4,021 4,163 4,671 5,129 4,861 4,839 5,172 4,860 5,129 5,238 
Greece 0,260 0,291 0,331 0,385 0,372 0,354 0,342 0,332 0,342 0,333 
Hungary 0,118 0,121 0,147 0,177 0,161 0,163 0,174 0,163 0,171 0,174 
Iceland 0,017 0,017 0,020 0,018 0,015 0,015 0,016 0,016 0,016 0,018 
Ireland 0,222 0,244 0,291 0,298 0,288 0,292 0,325 0,303 0,307 0,324 
Israel 0,183 0,189 0,213 0,245 0,238 0,266 0,295 0,296 0,334 0,347 
Italy 2,171 2,301 2,623 3,006 2,924 2,838 3,072 2,877 3,036 3,075 
 
  
Table 2e. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 5,066 4,769 4,750 5,342 5,814 6,303 6,792 6,761 5,491 5,121 
Korea 0,857 0,950 1,064 0,967 0,864 1,060 1,182 1,130 1,231 1,317 
Luxembourg 0,031 0,037 0,041 0,046 0,046 0,050 0,061 0,059 0,062 0,065 
Mexico 0,940 1,072 1,162 1,216 1,090 1,174 1,353 1,318 1,376 1,398 
Netherlands 0,884 0,951 1,078 1,219 1,141 1,114 1,188 1,094 1,153 1,177 
New Zealand 0,116 0,115 0,143 0,142 0,139 0,164 0,189 0,198 0,212 0,225 
Norway 0,363 0,429 0,477 0,584 0,464 0,542 0,658 0,685 0,691 0,657 
Poland 0,364 0,399 0,483 0,582 0,494 0,570 0,630 0,598 0,638 0,647 
Portugal 0,204 0,224 0,258 0,288 0,282 0,279 0,294 0,278 0,300 0,301 
Slovak Republic 0,067 0,077 0,101 0,127 0,123 0,124 0,130 0,124 0,133 0,135 
Slovenia 0,049 0,054 0,062 0,071 0,066 0,064 0,071 0,066 0,070 0,071 
Spain 1,393 1,565 1,851 2,099 2,078 1,994 2,132 2,038 2,157 2,147 
Sweden 0,470 0,515 0,599 0,645 0,560 0,618 0,709 0,689 0,737 0,723 
Switzerland 0,374 0,405 0,459 0,544 0,550 0,590 0,724 0,701 0,725 0,749 
Turkey 0,739 0,836 1,050 1,268 1,110 1,285 1,322 1,316 1,350 1,291 
United Kingdom 3,182 3,445 3,830 3,680 3,125 3,152 3,393 3,406 3,431 3,768 
United States 15,359 16,110 16,868 17,492 18,293 19,182 19,766 20,363 20,905 21,517 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  
 Table 2f. Labor productivity in OECD countries in 2005-2014 (GDP (PPP)) 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 0,838 0,890 0,939 0,979 1,052 1,083 1,140 1,186 1,243 1,303 
Austria 0,344 0,374 0,388 0,404 0,416 0,428 0,446 0,459 0,467 0,474 
Belgium 0,542 0,575 0,596 0,619 0,634 0,664 0,697 0,714 0,725 0,746 
Canada 1,304 1,375 1,425 1,470 1,505 1,564 1,631 1,670 1,723 1,800 
Chile 0,254 0,311 0,338 0,333 0,342 0,370 0,404 0,430 0,448 0,461 
Czech Republic 0,259 0,285 0,310 0,313 0,324 0,326 0,346 0,352 0,355 0,366 
Denmark 0,246 0,264 0,275 0,291 0,295 0,324 0,335 0,343 0,349 0,356 
Estonia 0,025 0,027 0,031 0,032 0,034 0,036 0,037 0,039 0,040 0,041 
Finland 0,216 0,231 0,248 0,260 0,258 0,267 0,280 0,282 0,288 0,293 
France 2,942 3,187 3,319 3,433 3,518 3,646 3,799 3,849 3,912 4,011 
Germany 3,937 4,163 4,326 4,460 4,425 4,638 4,774 4,880 4,962 5,050 
Greece 0,311 0,344 0,357 0,378 0,379 0,380 0,354 0,379 0,392 0,397 
Hungary 0,211 0,227 0,235 0,256 0,265 0,274 0,284 0,293 0,301 0,312 
Iceland 0,011 0,011 0,012 0,013 0,014 0,014 0,014 0,014 0,015 0,016 
Ireland 0,187 0,205 0,225 0,224 0,240 0,263 0,282 0,287 0,282 0,298 
Israel 0,207 0,217 0,229 0,229 0,237 0,252 0,267 0,283 0,296 0,307 
Italy 2,242 2,385 2,496 2,650 2,692 2,767 2,873 2,925 2,991 3,046 
 
  
Table 2f. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 4,276 4,427 4,627 4,716 4,706 4,951 5,044 5,158 5,229 5,270 
Korea 1,044 1,114 1,218 1,300 1,309 1,427 1,532 1,500 1,601 1,653 
Luxembourg 0,030 0,035 0,036 0,037 0,038 0,042 0,049 0,050 0,051 0,054 
Mexico 1,600 1,770 1,883 1,930 2,045 1,994 2,191 2,231 2,252 2,333 
Netherlands 0,824 0,887 0,927 0,974 0,966 0,990 1,026 1,029 1,054 1,085 
New Zealand 0,118 0,129 0,138 0,140 0,151 0,154 0,161 0,167 0,174 0,180 
Norway 0,308 0,343 0,348 0,378 0,356 0,382 0,411 0,438 0,440 0,454 
Poland 0,688 0,731 0,780 0,805 0,859 0,953 1,024 1,063 1,104 1,130 
Portugal 0,255 0,278 0,292 0,303 0,314 0,327 0,337 0,352 0,365 0,367 
Slovak Republic 0,130 0,144 0,159 0,171 0,172 0,182 0,184 0,190 0,200 0,207 
Slovenia 0,065 0,071 0,074 0,077 0,074 0,076 0,081 0,083 0,085 0,088 
Spain 1,556 1,720 1,851 1,952 2,052 2,089 2,172 2,283 2,357 2,390 
Sweden 0,402 0,440 0,467 0,484 0,481 0,501 0,522 0,533 0,550 0,568 
Switzerland 0,308 0,341 0,371 0,397 0,404 0,419 0,446 0,465 0,483 0,497 
Turkey 1,408 1,600 1,770 1,940 1,937 2,080 2,243 2,281 2,373 2,415 
United Kingdom 2,603 2,796 2,855 2,936 2,918 2,922 3,031 3,082 3,136 3,261 
United States 15,359 16,110 16,868 17,492 18,293 19,182 19,766 20,363 20,905 21,517 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  
 Table 2g. Labor productivity in OECD countries in 2005-2014 (GDP per capita) 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 41,47 43,75 51,25 55,37 54,05 66,43 78,90 79,36 76,16 72,82 
Austria 43,68 47,14 52,93 58,84 57,86 56,41 61,12 57,92 60,76 61,47 
Belgium 53,98 57,06 63,89 70,66 68,20 68,12 73,99 69,57 72,58 73,90 
Canada 40,77 45,30 49,37 51,68 47,43 54,83 59,71 59,67 59,01 56,99 
Chile 7,94 11,06 12,35 11,86 11,57 14,60 16,86 17,48 17,75 16,31 
Czech Republic 14,96 16,97 20,69 24,60 23,04 22,46 25,09 22,95 23,16 22,77 
Denmark 57,49 61,38 69,49 79,87 76,34 81,10 86,17 82,10 85,87 86,40 
Estonia 9,79 11,56 15,39 18,19 18,41 18,84 20,36 19,88 21,97 22,90 
Finland 46,55 48,88 57,10 64,79 61,19 59,38 65,46 61,31 64,95 65,71 
France 52,06 55,93 63,11 70,00 67,08 65,83 70,79 65,56 68,07 69,22 
Germany 48,77 50,57 56,82 62,54 59,42 59,19 64,39 60,35 63,50 64,58 
Greece 23,47 26,18 29,67 34,42 33,27 31,64 30,71 29,82 30,89 30,27 
Hungary 11,73 12,01 14,64 17,60 16,01 16,28 17,47 16,44 17,29 17,59 
Iceland 58,57 55,74 65,24 55,79 45,65 47,21 50,24 48,78 50,86 56,40 
Ireland 53,64 57,75 66,46 66,46 63,56 64,05 71,03 66,17 66,92 70,35 
Israel 26,46 26,83 29,66 33,48 31,82 34,91 37,95 37,49 41,43 42,24 
Italy 37,51 39,63 45,05 51,26 49,56 47,95 51,74 48,45 50,87 51,29 
 
  
Table 2g. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 27,45 29,52 31,59 27,40 24,25 28,72 30,41 30,44 31,57 33,04 
Korea 25,71 24,81 25,73 30,07 32,88 36,78 41,45 39,32 33,48 31,86 
Luxembourg 66,65 78,02 85,23 94,70 92,14 97,83 118,05 110,34 114,37 116,38 
Mexico 8,77 9,89 10,59 10,93 9,66 10,27 11,69 11,26 11,62 11,68 
Netherlands 54,19 58,18 65,78 74,13 69,00 67,02 71,15 65,32 68,64 69,79 
New Zealand 27,97 27,45 33,72 33,36 32,20 37,63 43,04 44,80 47,51 49,73 
Norway 78,36 91,82 101,02 122,10 95,78 110,34 132,27 136,04 135,63 127,51 
Poland 9,54 10,44 12,67 15,26 12,96 15,00 16,55 15,72 16,75 17,02 
Portugal 19,43 21,30 24,46 27,23 26,73 26,35 27,85 26,46 28,68 28,96 
Slovak Republic 12,39 14,35 18,78 23,59 22,79 22,78 24,18 22,88 24,57 24,98 
Slovenia 24,58 26,76 31,06 35,35 32,71 31,11 34,56 32,16 33,94 34,63 
Spain 31,89 35,28 40,91 45,64 44,81 42,82 45,62 43,59 46,29 46,21 
Sweden 51,99 56,53 65,21 69,65 59,95 65,68 74,81 72,07 76,45 74,13 
Switzerland 50,42 54,36 61,19 71,67 71,38 75,74 92,06 88,10 90,20 91,99 
Turkey 10,80 12,06 14,97 17,84 15,41 17,57 17,80 17,50 17,76 16,79 
United Kingdom 52,82 56,87 62,80 59,93 50,57 50,62 53,62 53,47 53,54 58,40 
United States 51,87 53,89 55,87 57,41 59,52 61,93 63,34 64,77 66,00 67,44 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  
Table 2h. Labor productivity in OECD countries in 2005-2014 (GDP (PPP) per capita) 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 28,10 31,00 32,01 33,76 33,87 33,97 31,84 34,05 35,44 36,15 
Austria 20,94 22,51 23,33 25,53 26,46 27,41 28,40 29,47 30,36 31,61 
Belgium 36,39 36,55 38,42 41,29 44,32 43,49 43,61 45,09 45,67 48,01 
Canada 45,31 48,43 51,37 50,02 53,01 57,69 61,71 62,52 61,49 64,74 
Chile 29,93 30,70 31,90 31,38 31,74 33,04 34,42 35,82 36,72 37,33 
Czech Republic 38,73 41,07 42,86 45,19 45,62 46,75 48,39 49,25 50,12 50,81 
Denmark 33,46 34,62 36,15 36,83 36,75 38,67 39,44 40,42 41,06 41,48 
Estonia 21,69 23,04 25,06 26,55 26,62 28,89 30,78 30,00 31,88 32,79 
Finland 65,36 73,35 74,31 75,49 76,97 83,69 93,63 93,19 93,62 95,89 
France 14,93 16,33 17,15 17,34 18,12 17,44 18,94 19,06 19,02 19,49 
Germany 50,47 54,24 56,62 59,21 58,41 59,59 61,49 61,42 62,73 64,33 
Greece 28,54 30,70 32,67 32,83 35,02 35,23 36,61 37,81 39,00 39,88 
Hungary 66,52 73,52 73,65 79,07 73,50 77,75 82,62 86,87 86,40 87,98 
Iceland 18,03 19,15 20,45 21,13 22,52 25,08 26,91 27,94 29,00 29,71 
Ireland 24,27 26,38 27,65 28,74 29,71 30,92 31,89 33,51 34,91 35,30 
Israel 24,09 26,75 29,54 31,75 31,82 33,63 34,17 35,18 36,93 38,14 
Italy 32,33 35,21 36,92 38,17 36,39 37,16 39,71 40,60 41,51 42,75 
 
  
 Table 2h. Continued 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 35,64 38,77 40,92 42,44 44,25 44,86 46,48 48,81 50,59 51,44 
Korea 44,41 48,27 50,90 52,31 51,46 53,21 55,08 55,76 57,07 58,28 
Luxembourg 41,57 45,65 49,38 52,26 52,40 53,82 56,71 58,43 60,09 61,09 
Mexico 20,58 23,09 25,23 27,30 26,89 28,44 30,22 30,34 31,21 31,41 
Netherlands 43,22 46,15 46,81 47,82 47,22 46,92 47,89 48,37 48,94 50,55 
New Zealand 51,87 53,89 55,87 57,41 59,52 61,93 63,34 64,77 66,00 67,44 
Norway 28,10 31,00 32,01 33,76 33,87 33,97 31,84 34,05 35,44 36,15 
Poland 20,94 22,51 23,33 25,53 26,46 27,41 28,40 29,47 30,36 31,61 
Portugal 36,39 36,55 38,42 41,29 44,32 43,49 43,61 45,09 45,67 48,01 
Slovak Republic 45,31 48,43 51,37 50,02 53,01 57,69 61,71 62,52 61,49 64,74 
Slovenia 29,93 30,70 31,90 31,38 31,74 33,04 34,42 35,82 36,72 37,33 
Spain 38,73 41,07 42,86 45,19 45,62 46,75 48,39 49,25 50,12 50,81 
Sweden 33,46 34,62 36,15 36,83 36,75 38,67 39,44 40,42 41,06 41,48 
Switzerland 21,69 23,04 25,06 26,55 26,62 28,89 30,78 30,00 31,88 32,79 
Turkey 65,36 73,35 74,31 75,49 76,97 83,69 93,63 93,19 93,62 95,89 
United Kingdom 14,93 16,33 17,15 17,34 18,12 17,44 18,94 19,06 19,02 19,49 
United States 50,47 54,24 56,62 59,21 58,41 59,59 61,49 61,42 62,73 64,33 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The available statistical data was analyzed in terms of given assumption. 
I.e., all OECD countries were divided into three groups, notably: 
countries which have reduced the corporate tax rates (the 1
st
 group) during 7 
years; 
countries which have increased the rates (the 2
nd
 group); and 
countries which did not make any changes (the 3
rd
 group). 
Moreover, all countries were arranged by each of eight indicators. 
Tables 3 and 4-a-d present the obtained results.  
In the Table 3,values of parameters are arranged according to the reduction of 
corporate tax burden. 
In Tables 4a-d values are arranged according to the increase of certain 
indicator: (GDP, GDP (PPP), GDP per capita, GDP (PPP) per capita, GDP per hour 
worked, GDP (PPP) per hour worked, GDP per hour worked per capita, GDP (PPP) 
per hour worked per capita). 
 
 
 Table 3. Ratios of macroeconomic indicators, based on the GDP to the changes of corporate tax rates in OECD countries 

















 per capita  per capita 
 per hour worked 
0,055 257,968 409,329 14477,099 22971,444 0,291 0,461 16,315 25,887 
0,030 137,104 246,354 13881,131 24942,158 0,174 0,312 17,590 31,607 
0,030 99,971 152,634 18454,040 28175,340 0,135 0,207 24,984 38,145 
0,020 16,693 14,210 51261,875 43637,270 0,018 0,016 56,399 48,010 
0,010 1282,725 2140,564 10714,826 17880,512 1,398 2,333 11,677 19,486 
0,000 1444,189 1095,384 61219,156 46433,299 1,718 1,303 72,821 55,233 
0,000 437,123 395,490 51306,674 46420,129 0,524 0,474 61,475 55,619 
0,000 534,672 481,474 47721,586 42973,425 0,828 0,746 73,902 66,549 
0,000 2846,889 2580,750 44538,147 40374,529 4,425 4,011 69,220 62,749 
0,000 246,438 226,768 53461,974 49194,773 0,324 0,298 70,354 64,738 
0,000 546,644 954,454 14378,622 25105,404 0,647 1,130 17,018 29,714 
0,000 806,108 1508,102 10482,140 19610,445 1,291 2,415 16,789 31,409 
0,000 17418,925 17418,925 54596,653 54596,653 21,517 21,517 67,442 67,442 
–0,004 62,395 51,411 111716,268 92048,548 0,065 0,054 116,378 95,891 
–0,010 500,244 345,160 97013,261 66937,460 0,657 0,454 127,510 87,979 
–0,030 238,023 284,255 21653,081 25858,773 0,333 0,397 30,271 36,150 
–0,030 25,953 35,621 19670,852 26998,783 0,030 0,041 22,899 31,430 
 
  

















 per capita  per capita 
 per hour worked 
–0,033 1416,949 1778,823 28100,717 35277,347 1,317 1,653 26,117 32,787 
–0,034 712,050 472,830 87475,464 58087,211 0,749 0,497 91,991 61,086 
–0,045 303,771 268,460 36990,982 32691,018 0,347 0,307 42,244 37,334 
–0,045 340,806 249,527 60563,623 44342,659 0,486 0,356 86,396 63,256 
–0,046 866,354 798,587 51372,963 47354,525 1,177 1,085 69,786 64,327 
–0,050 205,658 314,585 19563,330 29925,128 0,239 0,366 22,767 34,826 
–0,050 198,118 158,864 43837,294 35151,754 0,225 0,180 49,729 39,876 
–0,059 2147,952 2127,743 35823,219 35486,171 3,075 3,046 51,292 50,809 
–0,060 271,165 221,038 49496,717 40346,972 0,360 0,293 65,711 53,564 
–0,060 570,137 448,246 58491,468 45986,383 0,723 0,568 74,129 58,280 
–0,065 230,012 280,360 22130,488 26974,632 0,301 0,367 28,960 35,300 
–0,070 1406,855 1566,369 30278,346 33711,409 2,147 2,390 46,205 51,444 
–0,076 4616,335 4750,771 36331,742 37389,785 5,121 5,270 40,302 41,475 
–0,080 49,506 61,127 24019,253 29657,783 0,071 0,088 34,626 42,754 
–0,087 3859,547 3721,551 47589,972 45888,423 5,238 5,050 64,584 62,275 
–0,096 1788,717 1591,580 50397,862 44843,442 2,023 1,800 56,992 50,711 
–0,100 2945,146 2548,889 45653,410 39510,937 3,768 3,261 58,405 50,546 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Table 4a. Ratios of the GDP indicators to the changes of corporate tax rates 










(2014 – 2005), Yr 
GDP (PPP)  
(2014 рік) 
0,020 16,693 0,020 14,210 
–0,030 25,953 –0,030 35,621 
–0,080 49,506 –0,004 51,411 
–0,004 62,395 –0,080 61,127 
0,030 99,971 0,030 152,634 
0,030 137,104 –0,050 158,864 
–0,050 198,118 –0,060 221,038 
–0,050 205,658 0,000 226,768 
–0,065 230,012 0,030 246,354 
–0,030 238,023 –0,045 249,527 
0,000 246,438 –0,045 268,460 
0,055 257,968 –0,065 280,360 
–0,060 271,165 –0,030 284,255 
–0,045 303,771 –0,050 314,585 
–0,045 340,806 –0,010 345,160 
0,000 437,123 0,000 395,490 
–0,010 500,244 0,055 409,329 
0,000 534,672 –0,060 448,246 
0,000 546,644 –0,034 472,830 
–0,060 570,137 0,000 481,474 
–0,034 712,050 –0,046 798,587 
0,000 806,108 0,000 954,454 
–0,046 866,354 0,000 1095,384 
0,010 1282,725 0,000 1508,102 
–0,070 1406,855 –0,070 1566,369 
–0,033 1416,949 –0,096 1591,580 
0,000 1444,189 –0,033 1778,823 
–0,096 1788,717 –0,059 2127,743 
–0,059 2147,952 0,010 2140,564 
0,000 2846,889 –0,100 2548,889 
–0,100 2945,146 0,000 2580,750 
–0,087 3859,547 –0,087 3721,551 
–0,076 4616,335 –0,076 4750,771 
0,000 17418,925 0,000 17418,925 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 Table 4b. Ratios of the GDP indicators to the changes of corporate tax rates 




(2014 – 2005), Yr 





(2014 – 2005), Yr 
GDP (PPP) per 
capita  
(2014 Yr) 
0,000 10482,140 0,010 17880,512 
0,010 10714,826 0,000 19610,445 
0,030 13881,131 0,055 22971,444 
0,000 14378,622 0,030 24942,158 
0,055 14477,099 0,000 25105,404 
0,030 18454,040 –0,030 25858,773 
–0,050 19563,330 –0,065 26974,632 
–0,030 19670,852 –0,030 26998,783 
–0,030 21653,081 0,030 28175,340 
–0,065 22130,488 –0,080 29657,783 
–0,080 24019,253 –0,050 29925,128 
–0,033 28100,717 –0,045 32691,018 
–0,070 30278,346 –0,070 33711,409 
–0,059 35823,219 –0,050 35151,754 
–0,076 36331,742 –0,033 35277,347 
–0,045 36990,982 –0,059 35486,171 
–0,050 43837,294 –0,076 37389,785 
0,000 44538,147 –0,100 39510,937 
–0,100 45653,410 –0,060 40346,972 
–0,087 47589,972 0,000 40374,529 
0,000 47721,586 0,000 42973,425 
–0,060 49496,717 0,020 43637,270 
–0,096 50397,862 –0,045 44342,659 
0,020 51261,875 –0,096 44843,442 
0,000 51306,674 –0,087 45888,423 
–0,046 51372,963 –0,060 45986,383 
0,000 53461,974 0,000 46420,129 
0,000 54596,653 0,000 46433,299 
–0,060 58491,468 –0,046 47354,525 
–0,045 60563,623 0,000 49194,773 
0,000 61219,156 0,000 54596,653 
–0,034 87475,464 –0,034 58087,211 
–0,010 97013,261 –0,010 66937,460 
–0,004 111716,268 –0,004 92048,548 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 Table 4c. Ratios of the labor productivity to the changes of corporate tax 




(2014 – 2005), Yr 






(2014 – 2005), Yr 
GDP (PPP) per 
hour worked 
(2014 Yr) 
0,020 0,018 0,020 0,016 
–0,030 0,030 –0,030 0,041 
–0,004 0,065 –0,004 0,054 
–0,080 0,071 –0,080 0,088 
0,030 0,135 –0,050 0,180 
0,030 0,174 0,030 0,207 
–0,050 0,225 –0,060 0,293 
–0,050 0,239 0,000 0,298 
0,055 0,291 –0,045 0,307 
–0,065 0,301 0,030 0,312 
0,000 0,324 –0,045 0,356 
–0,030 0,333 –0,050 0,366 
–0,045 0,347 –0,065 0,367 
–0,060 0,360 –0,030 0,397 
–0,045 0,486 –0,010 0,454 
0,000 0,524 0,055 0,461 
0,000 0,647 0,000 0,474 
–0,010 0,657 –0,034 0,497 
–0,060 0,723 –0,060 0,568 
–0,034 0,749 0,000 0,746 
0,000 0,828 –0,046 1,085 
–0,046 1,177 0,000 1,130 
0,000 1,291 0,000 1,303 
–0,033 1,317 –0,033 1,653 
0,010 1,398 –0,096 1,800 
0,000 1,718 0,010 2,333 
–0,096 2,023 –0,070 2,390 
–0,070 2,147 0,000 2,415 
–0,059 3,075 –0,059 3,046 
–0,100 3,768 –0,100 3,261 
0,000 4,425 0,000 4,011 
–0,076 5,121 –0,087 5,050 
–0,087 5,238 –0,076 5,270 
0,000 21,517 0,000 21,517 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 Table 4d. Ratios of the labor productivity to the changes of corporate tax rates 




(2014 – 2005), Yr 
GDP per capita 





(2014 – 2005), Yr 
GDP (PPP) per 
capita per hour 
worked (2014 Yr) 
0,010 11,677 0,010 19,486 
0,055 16,315 0,055 25,887 
0,000 16,789 0,000 29,714 
0,000 17,018 0,000 31,409 
0,030 17,590 -0,030 31,430 
-0,050 22,767 0,030 31,607 
-0,030 22,899 -0,033 32,787 
0,030 24,984 -0,050 34,826 
-0,033 26,117 -0,065 35,300 
-0,065 28,960 -0,030 36,150 
-0,030 30,271 -0,045 37,334 
-0,080 34,626 0,030 38,145 
-0,076 40,302 -0,050 39,876 
-0,045 42,244 -0,076 41,475 
-0,070 46,205 -0,080 42,754 
-0,050 49,729 0,020 48,010 
-0,059 51,292 -0,100 50,546 
0,020 56,399 -0,096 50,711 
-0,096 56,992 -0,059 50,809 
-0,100 58,405 -0,070 51,444 
0,000 61,475 -0,060 53,564 
-0,087 64,584 0,000 55,233 
-0,060 65,711 0,000 55,619 
0,000 67,442 -0,060 58,280 
0,000 69,220 -0,034 61,086 
-0,046 69,786 -0,087 62,275 
0,000 70,354 0,000 62,749 
0,000 72,821 -0,045 63,256 
0,000 73,902 -0,046 64,327 
-0,060 74,129 0,000 64,738 
-0,045 86,396 0,000 66,549 
-0,034 91,991 0,000 67,442 
-0,004 116,378 -0,010 87,979 
-0,010 127,510 -0,004 95,891 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
From the Tables 3, 4a-d it can be seen that 21 OECD countries have reduced 
the corporate tax rates (the 1
st
 group), 8 countries did not make any changes (2
nd
 
group) and 5 countries have increased the rates (the 3
rd
 group). 
For each of these groups we statistically tested the hypotheses about 
independence between GDP, GDP(PPPs), both in absolute terms and per capita, and 
also of all indicators, normalized on per hour worked and CTR. To some detail, we 
divided OECD countries into three groups according to values of their efficiency 
indicators: countries with high, moderate and low efficiency. 
Following to the assumption, the governments of low-efficient countries tend 
to increase the corporate tax burden, those with moderate efficiency tend to reduce 
this burden, and governments of high-efficient countries keep it unchanged. 
Consequently for each efficiency indicator we take an appropriate sample: the less 
efficient economies with increased CIT rate; economies with moderate efficiency 
with reduced CIT rate, and the most efficient economies which did not make changes. 
In order to confirm this assumption and to reject the hypothesis about 
independence between trend of the change of the CIT rate and certain efficiency 
indicator, the number of economies in the appropriate groups should fall in the 95% 
confidence interval. 
The obtained results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
  
Table 5. The results of statistical test between efficiency of economics and 
changes the CIT rates 
The tax trend positive 
Number of countries meeting the 
criteria 
5 of 34 
 
Indicator number of countries in the 
sample meeting the criteria 
C.I. (95%) 
GDP 3 of 6 [0,242; 1,523] 
GDP (PPPs) 3 of 9 [0,582; 2,065] 
GDP per capita 4 of 6 [0,242; 1,523] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita 3 of 4 [0,047; 1,130] 
GDP per hour worked 3 of 6 [0,242; 1,523] 
GDP (PPPs) per hour worked 3 of 10 [0,705; 2,236] 
GDP per capita per hour worked 3 of 5 [0,140; 1,331] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita per hour 
worked 
3 of 6 [0,242; 1,523] 
The tax trend zero 
Number of countries meeting the 
criteria 
8 of 34 
 
Indicator number of countries in the 
sample meeting the criteria 
C.I. (95%) 
GDP 6 of 17 [2,655; 5,345] 
GDP (PPPs) 6 of 15 [2,194; 4,865] 
GDP per capita 4 of 10 [1,128; 3,578] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita 4 of 8 [0,742; 3,023] 
GDP per hour worked 5 of 14 [1,971; 4,618] 
GDP (PPPs) per hour worked 5 of 13 [1,752; 4,366] 
GDP per capita per hour worked 6 of 14 [1,971; 4,618] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita per hour 
worked 
6 of 13 [1,752; 4,366] 
The tax trend negative 
Number of countries meeting the 
criteria 
21 of 34 
 
Indicator number of countries in the 
sample meeting the criteria 
C.I. (5%) 
GDP 8 of 11 [3,492; 10,096] 
GDP (PPPs) 8 of 10 [2,960; 9,393] 
GDP per capita 15 of 18 [7,594; 14,641] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita 17 of 22 [10,215; 16,962] 
GDP per hour worked 10 of 14 [5,173; 12,121] 
GDP (PPPs) per hour worked 8 of 11 [3,492; 10,096] 
GDP per capita per hour worked 13 of 15 [5,760; 12,770] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita per hour 
worked 
13 of 15 [5,760; 12,770] 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 6. The results of statistical test between changes of CIT rates and 
efficiency of economies 
Indicator 
Number of countries  
meeting the criteria C.I. (95%) 
total in the sample 
GDP 
High efficiency 17 of 34 6 of 8 [1,576; 6,424] 
Average efficiency 11 of 34 8 of 21 [4,997; 8,591] 
Low efficiency 6 of 34 3 of 5 [0,168; 1,597] 
GDP (PPPs) 
High efficiency 15 of 34 6 of 8 [1,391; 5,668] 
Average efficiency 10 of 34 8 of 21 [4,543; 7,810] 
Low efficiency 9 of 34 3 of 5 [0,252; 2,395] 
GDP per capita 
High efficiency 10 of 34 4 of 8 [0,927; 3,779] 
Average efficiency 21 of 34 15 of 21 [9,540; 16,401] 
Low efficiency 3 of 34 2 of 5 [0,084; 0,798] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita 
High efficiency 8 of 34 4 of 8 [0,742; 3,023] 
Average efficiency 22 of 34 17 of 21 [9,995; 17,182] 
Low efficiency 4 of 34 3 of 5 [0,112; 1,064] 
GDP per hour worked 
High efficiency 14 of 34 7 of 8 [1,298; 5,290] 
Average efficiency 14 of 34 10 of 21 [6,360; 10,934] 
Low efficiency 6 of 34 3 of 5 [0,168; 1,597] 
GDP (PPPs) per hour worked 
High efficiency 13 of 34 5 of 8 [1,205; 4,912] 
Average efficiency 11 of 34 8 of 21 [4,997; 8,591] 
Low efficiency 10 of 34 3 of 5 [0,280; 2,661] 
GDP per capita per hour worked 
High efficiency 14 of 34 6 of 8 [1,298; 5,290] 
Average efficiency 15 of 34 13 of 21 [6,814; 11,715] 
Low efficiency 5 of 34 3 of 5 [0,140; 1,331] 
GDP (PPPs) per capita per hour worked 
High efficiency 13 of 34 6 of 8 [1,205; 4,912] 
Average efficiency 15 of 34 13 of 21 [6,814; 11,715] 
Low efficiency 6 of 34 3 of 5 [0,168; 1,597] 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  
 4. Discussion 
From the tables 5 and 6 it can be seen that for all OECD countries with 0,95 
probability the most of hypotheses about independence between the trend of changes 
of the CIT rates and values of efficiency indicators (20 of 24, 83,3%) and vice versa: 
the independence between values of these indicators and changes of the corporate tax 
burden (17 of 24, 70,8%) are rejected. 
This shows that there is the mutual interaction between changes of the 
corporate tax burden and economic efficiency of countries according to all 
measurement methods. The obtained conclusion provides an answer to one of the 
tasks of our study which concerns the implicit dependence between government’s tax 
behavior and each of eight indicators of the economic efficiency for OECD countries. 
Moreover the assumption stating that the tax behavior of government 
corresponds to that of satisfiers is confirmed. Besides we can assume that not only tax 
behavior could be considered as satisfying but also any other economic behavior of 
the government. 
For additional substantiation of this hypothesis we established the following 
trends: 
1. 3 of 5 countries (60%), which increased the CIT rate during 10 years, are among 
the 5 less productive economies, and 4 of 5 (80%) belong to the 8 less productive 
ones. Iceland is the single exception being on the 17
th
 place among 34 countries. 
But it should be noted that Iceland perhaps suffered mostly among OECD and EU 
countries in the period of financial and economic crisis in 2008, so in order to save 
the economy it used the sufficiently rigorous tools, notably, the substantial 
increase of the corporate tax burden. Further after stabilization of the 
macroeconomic environment, there was no changes in CIT rate but in 2014 the 
revenue from collection of CIT exceeded the revenue obtained in 2005. Thus it 
can be argued that in the case of Iceland there was a powerful externality which 
has been distorted the whole picture. 
3 of 5 countries which increased the CIT rate are among the 6 the less 
productive OECD economies in terms of GDP (PPPs) per hour worked per capita 
while in the upper half of the list (among 18 the most productive economies) these 
countries are absent. 
2. At once, 6 of 8 (75%) countries which did not change the CIT rates are among 14 
of 34 (41%) the most effective OECD economies in terms of GDP per hour 
worked per capita. By GDP (PPPs) per hour worked per capita these 6 countries 
are among 13 the most effective countries (38%). 
3. Finally the 3rd group – economies with average productivity – which contains 15 
countries (15-29 places in terms of GDP productivity and 14-28 places in terms of 
the GDP (PPPs) productivity). In both of these groups 13 countries of 15 (almost 
87%) in 2014 had a smaller tax burden than in 2005. 
Since there are 21 OECD countries which reduced the tax burden, the 13 of 21 
(62%) countries have the moderate labor productivity (44% of total number of 
countries) (table 7a-d, 8a-d). 
Table 7a. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labour productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP) and trends of changes of the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero positive 
the more 
productive 
10 59 48 6 35 75 1 6 20 17 100 50 
moderately 
productive 
8 73 38 2 18 25 1 9 20 11 100 32 
the less 
productive 
3 50 14 0 0 0 3 50 60 6 100 18 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 7b. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labour productivity in 




Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
8 53 38 6 40 75 1 7 20 15 100 44 
moderately 
productive 
8 80 38 1 10 13 1 10 20 10 100 29 
the less 
productive 
5 56 24 1 11 13 3 33 60 9 100 26 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 7c. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labour productivity in 




Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
6 60 29 4 40 50 0 0 0 10 100 29 
moderately 
productive 
15 83 71 2 11 25 1 6 20 18 100 53 
the less 
productive 
0 0 0 2 33 25 4 67 80 6 100 18 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 7d. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labor productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP(PPPs) per capita) and trends of changes of 
the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
4 50 19 4 50 50 0 0 0 8 100 24 
moderately 
productive 
17 77 81 3 14 38 2 9 40 22 100 65 
the less 
productive 
0 0 0 1 25 13 3 75 60 4 100 12 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 8a. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labor productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP per hour worked) and trends of changes of 
the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
8 57 38 5 36 63 1 7 20 14 100 41 
moderately 
productive 
10 71 48 3 21 38 1 7 20 14 100 41 
the less 
productive 
3 50 14 0 0 0 3 50 60 6 100 18 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 8b. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labor productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP(PPPs) per hour worked) and trends of 
changes of the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
7 54 33 5 38 63 1 8 20 13 100 38 
moderately 
productive 
8 73 38 2 18 25 1 9 20 11 100 32 
the less 
productive 
6 60 29 1 10 13 3 30 60 10 100 29 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 8c. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labor productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP per capita per hour worked) and trends of 
changes of the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
8 57 38 6 43 75 0 0 0 14 100 41 
moderately 
productive 
13 87 62 0 0 0 2 13 40 15 100 44 
the less 
productive 
0 0 0 2 40 25 3 60 60 5 100 15 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 8d. The mutual numerical distribution of groups of labor productivity in 
economy (in terms of GDP(PPPs) per capita per hour worked) and 
trends of changes of the CIT rates 
Group of 
economies 
Trend of change 
Total 
negative zero negative 
the more 
productive 
7 54 33 6 46 75 0 0 0 13 100 24 
moderately 
productive 
13 87 62 0 0 0 2 13 40 15 100 65 
the less 
productive 
1 17 5 2 33 25 3 50 60 6 100 12 
Total 21 62 100 8 24 100 5 15 100 34 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The economies, which governments have increased, reduced or did not make 
changes of the corporate tax burned, arranged by each of eight efficiency indicators, 
are presented on Fig. 1a-h. Some trends between CRT and efficiency indicators could 
be observed even visually. Notably, it is evident that almost all economies, in which 
the corporate tax burden has been increased, are the less productive ones, while both 
in the more productive and moderately productive economies the tax burden has been 
reduced.  
Figure. 1. Dependence of the trend of the corporate tax burden from both GDP 
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h) GDP(PPP) per hour worked per capita 
The next question is which efficiency indicators are closer correlated to 
changes of the CIT rate? From the Tables 5 and 6 it can be seen that only indicators 
of labor productivity per capita (in absolute terms and by purchasing power parity, 
i.e. GDP per capita per hour worked, GDP (PPPs) per capita per hour worked) in all 
cases fall in the 95% confidence interval. In further analysis one can use either or 
both of these two indicators since they demonstrate the approximately equal mutual 
interaction with changes of the CIT rate. 
These observations can be explained as follows. 
In general OECD countries tend to reduce the corporate tax burden in order to 
compensate for investors the potential loss of their profits. But this policy has its 
limits, since the taxes cannot be reduced incessantly. Thus, the low-efficient 
economies risk to face the underpayment of taxes and/or problems with provision of 
social benefits or to face the significant budget deficit. So, the these governments try 
to ensure the certain required level of budget revenue, notably, by increasing the 
corporate tax burden in order to collect more taxes. 
When the country achieves the minimum required level of budget revenue the 
government attempts to improve the investment climate in the economy, so the trend 
changes to the opposite, i.e. to the reduction of the tax burden. 
This behavior is typical for countries with moderate economic efficiency, while 
a large number of developed (the most efficient) countries are satisfied with this 
situation, maintaining the current CIT rates. Consequently, one part of the most 
efficient economies similarly reduces the CIT rate aiming to improve the tax climate 
and to increase the tax base, while the rest of them does not consider the reasons for 
changing taxes and they keep the status quo. So the behavior of the most efficient 
economies varies from maximizers to satisfiers. 
And the opposite is true: the most of states with fixed CIT rates are among the 
most effective ones; the greater part of countries which increase the corporate tax 
burden are among the less efficient ones and the majority of countries with reduced 
tax pressure have the intermediate efficiency. In each of the above cases “majority” 
means the 60% and more of the total number of countries. 
In other words, it is sufficiently obvious that the efficiency of the economy is 
the main factor which influences on decision making on reduction, increase or 
maintaining the tax burden. The trend is the following: if the country is not among 
the economically efficient leaders and at the same time the risks of budget imbalances 
are insignificant, it tends to attract investment by reducing the corporate tax burden. 
Almost 40% of OECD countries (13 of 34 countries) adopted this policy. 
 
  
 5. Conclusion 
1. In order to study the government’s tax behavior, the factors and conditions 
determining the decision-making, we analyzed its possible correlation with set 
of indicators of economic efficiency, i.e. the GDP indicators normalized in 
various ways on the level of domestic prices, on per capita data and on per 
hour worked. 
2. We found the correlation between the government’s tax behavior (defined as 
the difference between corporate tax burden at the beginning and the end of 
period) and each of selected indicators. 
3. We find out that the government’s tax behavior depends more on such labor 
productivity indicators as GDP per capita per hour worked and GDP (PPPs) 
per capita per hour worked per capita 
4. The analysis allowed us to divide all OECD countries into three groups 
according their tax behavior: those who increase their corporate tax burden, 
those who reduce it and those who does not use the tax instruments, notably, in 
order to attract the foreign investors. 
5. It is arguably that the government tax behavior can be characterized as 
satisfying, i.e. governments in general act as satisfiers. In less efficient 
economies governments primarily aim to achieve the required level of budget 
revenue, so they tend to increase the tax burden. Governments of the 
economies with moderate efficiency which do not face the acute problem of 
budget fulfillment, consider the improvement of the economic climate and 
attraction of new investors by reducing the corporate tax burden as one of their 
main goals. 
6. The more “satisfied” are governments of the most efficient countries, many of 
whom does not use the regulatory function of the corporate tax. 
7. But in general there is a trend related to the reduction of the tax burden, which 
can be considered not only as intention to attract the new investment, but also 
as the fight for investors. Under specific conditions such fight could lead to a 
“race to the bottom” situation, i.e. to the inefficient state of all economic 
systems participated in this race. Thus, determining the reasons, factors and 
conditions favoring the race to the bottom between OECD and other countries 
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 Factors influencing tax behavior in OECD countries 
Abstract 
The article deals with investigation of principles, factors and conditions of the 
government’s tax behavior, notably by means of changing the tax burden. 
We define da set of potential indicators of the economic efficiency, based on 
the GDP and normalized in various ways on the level of consumer prices in the 
country, on per capita data and on per hour worked. By using the statistical analysis 
techniques we found the statistical dependence between government’s behavior and 
each of the selected indicators. We argued that the factor of labor of productivity per 
capita has the biggest impact on the government’s tax decisions. Also we showed that 
the governments mostly act as satisfiers. The obtained results allow to understand the 
principles of governments’ decision-making, and, therefore, to forecast in some way 
their behavior in certain economic conditions. Moreover, it could help to understand 
the reasons why the “race to the bottom” situation appears. 
The present paper differs from previous studies both by the topic, studying the 
relations between government’s tax behavior and economic efficiency of their 
jurisdictions and by the approach to define this dependence, since the latest can be 
observed only when each variant of government’s tax reaction is analyzed separately. 
Keywords: economic efficiency; corporate tax burden; tax compliance; 
satisfying behavior; GDP; labor productivity 
JEL Codes: C12, E22, G38, H30 
 
